Abstract
In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing ...
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In this paper I propose an argument against the conciliatory view in peer disagreement. One of the most important grounds for conciliatory views is the assumption that the epistemic situation in peer disagreement between two peers is symmetri cal. Symmetry justifies the conciliatory views. If so, showing that the situation is actually asymmetric should count as a refutation to conciliatory views of disagreement. By appealing to the difference between the processes by which the beliefs of the two parties have been formed, I try to show that there is a difference between the reliabilities of the two beliefs. This means the asymmetrical situation between two peers in disagreement. Since the conciliatory and steadfast views are contradictory views, any argument against one of them should be considered as an argument for the other.
omid karim zadeh
Abstract
In this paper, after a short review of the conception of justification in political philosophy, I describe the concept of 'burdens of judgment' in Rawls's political philosophy and show how the effects of the conception prevent people from reaching agreements on the most political, moral or religious ...
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In this paper, after a short review of the conception of justification in political philosophy, I describe the concept of 'burdens of judgment' in Rawls's political philosophy and show how the effects of the conception prevent people from reaching agreements on the most political, moral or religious judgments. Then, I describe the 'Asymmetry Objection' to Rawls's political philosophy and mention some contemporary political reactions to it briefly. I'll then take Quong's solution for this objection. This solution is based on a distinction between two different kinds of disagreements which are called foundational and justificatory disagreements respectively. Quong claims that the mentioned distinction corresponds the distinction between the disagreements concerning the matters of justice and disagreements concerning the matters of good. After describing Quong's solution, I'll criticize it and through some points concerning the epistemology of disagreement show what revisions it should have if it supposed to work and solve the problem.
